На конференции состоялся заинтересованный разговор по проблематике ограничений противоракетных средств, дальнейшего сокращения стратегических и тактических ядерных вооружений с возможностью выхода в перспективе на «глобальный ядерный ноль», предотвращения размещения оружия в космическом пространстве. Также обсуждалась целесообразность введения международно-правового запрета на использование ударных беспилотных летательных аппаратов против гражданского населения в ходе конфликтных ситуаций.
В.П.Козин выступил на встрече в качестве одного из основных докладчиков на тему «ПРО США и другие виды вооружений. Позиция России. Пути преодоления тупика». В своём выступлении он подверг критике позицию США по сокращению вооружений и ограничению военной деятельности, в частности, занятую в вопросе ПРО, тактического ядерного оружия (ТЯО) и обычных вооружений. Была также проблематика недопущения развертывания оружия любого рода в космическом пространстве. Своё выступление консультант директора РИСИ традиционно иллюстрировал авторскими слайдами.
В.П.Козин обратил особое внимание на то обстоятельство, что Соединённые Штаты Америки являются единственным государством в мире, которое имеет и ударные противоракетные системы, и тактическое ядерное оружие, и радиолокационные средства предупреждения о ракетном нападении далеко за пределами своей национальной территории, а также располагают наступательной ядерной военной доктриной, которая до сих пор остаётся неизменной. В своём выступлении В.П.Козин привёл ряд конкретных количественных показателей, связанных с названными видами вооружений. Эти показатели время от времени появляются в официальных американских документах, например, Конгресса США и Пентагона. Докладчик негативно отозвался о выступлении президента США Б.Обамы в Берлине 19 июня этого года и о новой американской ядерной установке «Стратегия применения ядерного оружия», которые не предусматривают радикальных мер в сфере сокращения ракетно-ядерных вооружений и практически полностью обходят стороной такую актуальную тему современной мировой политики как глобальная система ПРО США и их ближайших союзников по НАТО.
Сотрудник РИСИ принял участие и в подготовке итогового документа встречи – «Кирунского заявления», в котором, в частности, отражены положения о том, что страны Североатлантического союза расширяют территорию, находящуюся за Северным Полярным кругом, с целью проведения на ней военных учений; что средства ПРО США наземного и морского базирования подрывают международную стабильность, а их тактическое ядерное оружие, дислоцированное на европейском континенте, несёт в себе негативные последствия. В заявление также был включён призыв ко всем космическим государствам незамедлительно начать переговоры на самом высшем уровне с целью предотвращения гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве.
Доклад консультанта директора РИСИ, члена-корреспондента РАЕН В.П.Козина на международной конференции в городе Кируна (на английском языке):
© Vladimir Kozin. 2013
Vladimir P. Kozin, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Adviser to the Director, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Member, Interagency Working Group on BMD issues with NATO, Presidential Administration
International Conference on the High North and International Security
Kiruna, Sweden, 29 June 2013
THE US BMD AND OTHER WEAPONS: RUSSIA’S STANCE. THE WAY TO OVERCOME THE DEADLOCK
Despite efforts to improve US-Russia relations, the two countries remain at loggerheads in a number of areas.
In recent years, the failure to make any real headway over arms controlhas been most evident in ballistic missile defense (BMD). Why should Russians worry about the fielding of an inherently defensive system? Graphic answer is given here: compare this map with that one.
The problem is that when viewed from Russia’s perspective, the American BMD assets can undercut Russia’s own nuclear deterrent and hence increase that country’s vulnerability to a first (that is, offensive) nuclear strike by the US that may be delivered on the basis of the US offensive nuclear deterrence doctrine. Given the deployment in Europe of US strategic and tactical nuclear arms as well as conventional weapons, America and NATO’s BMD “defense umbrella” very close to the Russian territory is for all intents and purposesa real “forward based weapon” that offers Moscow too little time to adopt a crucial decision in case of emergency. The NATO Summit in Chicago last May has forged a new triad comprised from “an appropriate mix on nuclear, conventional and missile defense weapons”.
At the same time, Russian military and political leaders have no intention to develop and preposition its BMD systems, its conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons on the American continents.
However, the American tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) are still stored in Europe. The nuclear free-fall bombs – some of them having the yield of more than 400 kiloton are being constantly modernized (three types of them can be carried by medium-range joint strike fighters and heavy strategic bombers from 13 bases in Europe. No other country in the world deploys TNW outside its territory, except the USA. Washington has ambitious plans to modernize its strategic nuclear arsenal up to 2075 and beyond. TNW will be modernized at least by 2050, with their delivery systems – by 2070. The new “Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the USA” announced by the White House on 19th June 2013, clearly states that the President “has supported significant investments” to modernize the US nuclear enterprise. An interagency detailed analysis recently conducted in the USA did not set out to address tactical nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe to support NATO.
For more than 11 years since Washington has unilaterally withdrawn from the ABM Treaty the US side has neglected all suggestions in this direction that came from Moscow. Russia has not been participating in drafting the EPAA, NATO’s BMD “Road Map” and “BMD Rules of Engagement”. The special message from President Barack Obama delivered to his counterpart Vladimir Putin in mid-March by the US National Security Adviser contained nothing new to overcome the existing deadlock in Russo-American relations over the missile defense. No new constructive ideas have been articulated by high-ranking US officials during the international conferences on security issues held in Moscow at the end of May and earlier in June 2013.
Barack Obama’s remarks delivered in Berlin on 19th June contain no constructive proposals and specific suggestions to curb the nuclear and missile defense arms race. Subsequently announced the US “Nuclear Weapons Employment Strategy of the USA” confirms: the USA will retain offensive nuclear deterrence policy, including regional nuclear deterrence, indefinitely, and the potential for “a surprise, disarming nuclear attack”. As to the CTBT: in Berlin Barack Obama gave empty promises to ratify the treaty drafted in 1996. The missile defense issue was not even mentioned by him at all. The result is obvious: number of the US hi-tech interceptors will increase drastically – around 700 only in SM-3 by 2020. Plus 98 THAAD interceptors (Theater High Altitude Area Missile Defense) will be added in 2014, and 270 in 2017. The Patriot missiles are not included into these figures.
Russia is doubtful that the Phase 4 of the EPAA has been cancelled. It will be continued beyond 2022 in the form of the EPAA-2. Vice Admiral James D. Syring, the US Missile Defense Agency Director, stated in the House of Representatives on 8th May 2013 that a larger interceptor missile would be required to achieve burn out velocity, pushing the initial operational capability out past 2022.
There are new ideas articulated in the Pentagon of developing universal, unified warheads for eventual installation on interceptors of various types. The SM-3 interceptor is being equipped with not only BMD warhead, but with supersonic conventional warhead capable to perform combat striking missions versus fixed targets on the ground. There is also a renewed discussion in the USA to equip new types of interceptors with multiple independently targeted warheads to increase the zone of their ‘hit-to-kill’ capacity, especially if the interceptors will be carried on combat ships, sailing around Europe and Asia. A number of the US combat ships equipped with Aegis BMD system have already sailed in the Arctic seas.
This will be a significant build-up of the US capabilities in the field of missile defense and can initiate a new arms race – ‘the missile defense arms race’.
Furthermore, there is no agreement between Moscow and Washington on preventing the militarization of outer space, on banning anti-satellite weapons. Since the beginning of a space age in 1957 the USA has blocked nearly 20 international initiatives banning the emplacement of offensive weapons in space.
For the purpose of enhancing both the BMD and TNW potential near the Russian borders huge early warning radars (EWR) have been installed in Vardø, Norway, and at Thule base in Greenland and at Clear (Alaska). As Vice Admiral James D. Syring has admitted in the Senate hearing on 9th May 2013, the Pentagon plans to complete upgrading the EWR constructed at Beale (California), Fylingdales (the UK) and Thule (Greenland) so that they have the same software configuration. It means that all these radars are to be closely interlinked. The US and Norway have established satellite stations on the Island of Svalbard which violate Article 9 of the Treaty of Svalbard that forbids the deployment of any war-fighting assets. These installations create concern in Russia. Unfortunately, the number of military satellites that are used for the BMD purposes is increasing: the existing ‘Space Tracking and Surveillance System’ (STSS) will be enhanced by a new fleet of early warning satellites called ‘Precision Tracking Space System’ (PTSS) that has been terminated, but not cancelled at all. Last year the STSS has been used as a single tool to provide launch data for SM-IA interceptor missile. No doubt: there is a desire of Washington and its NATO allies to use all these tools to gain the military supremacy over the rest of the world and to use them for hostile purposes on land, at seas, in the air and in outer space.
Washington does not agree to resolve the issue of the prevention of collisions of nuclear-powered submarines that are sailing under the Arctic ice. There is a strong tendency to emplace conventional warheads on strategic carriers (e.g. on SSBNs), and to use drones on a large scale – everywhere, anytime, versus anyone. 154 SLCM launched from just one the US SSGN (strategic submarine with guided missile, nuclear) deployed in the Barents Sea can hit all Russian SOA sites, command and control centers and nearly all energy supply installations in Europe. The US “Prompt Global Strike” concept has not been cancelled. There are no official talks on this issue.
Therefore, Moscow had and still has only one choice: to react to all these actions that runs counter to the spirit of ‘strategic partnership’ existing only in words, rather than in deeds between the USA and Russia. In response to America’s BMD deployment plans, Russia has threatened to withdraw from the latest strategic offensive arms (SOA) agreement known as the Prague Treaty signed in 2010 (labeled in the US as a New START and in Russia as START-3). The treaty permitted the two sides to have 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads each by 2017 – a formidable force outweighing nuclear capabilities of the rest of the world combined.
There is no breakthrough in conventional forces. The former treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe or CFE is dead, with no desire of the USA to draft a qualitatively new arrangement – CFE-2 – that should include all NATO member-states and avoid the disparities between East and West in conventional weapons. A new treaty is highly required due to drastic changes in military balances in Europe since 1990. In Moscow’s view, it should not have flank limitations or any linkage with potential conflicts. All NATO member-states, including new entrants of the Alliance, should become the full-fledged members of the new European CFE treaty and honor its provisions. Russia is also concerned about a large-scale drills conducted in the High North and the Arctic area, involving too many personnel and military hardware.
So, the arms control process is in a deep abyss. The main cause of a deadlock in arms control has not changed for decades: there simply is not enough trust between the two countries to make tangible progress in all these and other areas. The other major reason is a lust for military supremacy.
It is high time that we move on. The arms control process should be revived in many spheres, and not be limited only to SOA. The vision of a nuclear weapons-free world may well be attainable not so quickly, but that is no excuse for failing to take at least limited steps in that direction. And here both the US and Russia carry special responsibility. In order that all nuclear-weapon states are involved in a nuclear arms reduction process, the following arrangements must be taken:
- All nuclear-weapon states must declare a no-first use of nuclear weapons’ policy against one another – no later than 2015. It would, no doubt, improve the global military and political atmosphere. The longer the USA is committed to the first ‘preemptive and preventive’ nuclear strikes, the stronger is the desire of the rest of the world to acquire the same offensive nuclear deterrence posture. That is why this measure is a very demanding one.
- Russia and the USA must reach a deal on downsizing their nuclear capabilities to an aggregate level equal to the number of nuclear weapons at the disposal of all other states accompanied with the pledge of the latter not to increase these weapons in the future (such a deal could be reached during next START-4, START-5, START-6 and START-7 talks between the USA and Russia). It would be difficult to encourage the rest of the nuclear world to participate in the reductions of nuclear weapons, if such steps are not made. So, all nuclear-weapon states not involved in the nuclear reduction talks have to join in the process not later than 2030-2040.
- All nuclear weapon“haves” – both de jure and de facto – must set up an approximate, non-legally-binding or legally-binding deadline (why not?) for the creation of a nuclear-free world: for example, in 2045 or later, by mutual agreement. Such a Rubicon is needed as an incentive to make more rational calculations in terms of production and elimination of nuclear weapons. In 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev suggested to create a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. Why not to try to set up a new target date to reach this goal once again? On 28th May 2013 Russia once again has officially repeated its positive stance on a ‘global nuclear zero’, by saying that it is committed to the obligations stipulated in Article 6 of the NPT.
Russia and the US could go one step further, such as pushing for even lower limits for their SOA. Europe should be freed from all American TNW and brought back to the continental United States thus removing that “legacy of the Cold War in Europe”. Such a move might lead to tactical nuclear arms reduction talks.
There should not be any US BMD installation on the European soil – be it in the form of interceptors to be fielded in Redzikovo, Poland and in Deveselu, Romania, or in the form of BMD early warning radars like those built in Fylingdales, Thule, Vardø and Malatja (Turkey), that are enhancing the US war-fighting machine – the mechanism that has been officially created in the NATO Chicago summit as “an appropriate mix” of nuclear, conventional and missile defense weapons. All these radars have to be dismantled for good as foreign installations. This would necessitate the full cancellation of the EPAA – the most destabilizing and provocative program since the end of the Cold War. It will be of no less importance to sign reciprocal legally-binding guarantees not to use BMD against each other. Europe should be freed from foreign BMD systems, especially taking into account the US intention to enhance its BMD assets on the continental USA.
At the same time the right of all nations for self-defense should be honored, provided their weapons does not pose any threat towards their neighbors or adjacent regions, and does not undermine the delicate strategic equation between the East and West, South and North. Instead of stockpiling Europe with foreign BMD bases, all nations with BMD capabilities have to draft a new international multilateral ABM Treaty that could limit the number of interceptors and their deployment around the globe in a way that threatens no one. How many to be left? It is expedient not to have more than it was stipulated by the former ABM Treaty: that is maximum 100 interceptors per nation.
There is a rather alarming tendency to use striking drones or unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) for offensive operations, sometimes to kill innocent civilians. The use of these military gimmicks can be classified as encroachment upon the sovereignty of other nations and a violation of the humanitarian law. For example, since June 2004 till September 2012 the US UCAVs killed in Pakistan more than 3,300 people, including nearly 180 children. Only two percent amongst those killed have been identifies as terrorists. So, the collateral damage is too high. The number of drones in the USA alone has reached the level of 8,500 pieces. The Pentagon plans to use huge combat drones to deliver strategic strikes and use them in executing the BMD missions. The world community has to curtail the use of remotely-operated drones to perform striking tasks, to deliver nuclear and missile defense weapons. It is expedient to elaborate specific codes of conduct for the regional use of UCAVs, which can perform combat missions equal to those fulfilled by a manned combat aircraft.
While the 20th century has been called as “the nuclear arms age”, the current century may get the label of “the age of the missile defense arms race”.
But do we all really need it?
The world community, unfortunately, spends too much money on arms. But it should spend this huge amount of money on social and economic needs, healthcare, education, culture and building trust and confidence between all the nations.
That is why it is important to revive the stalled arms control process between Washington and Moscow in general terms. Therefore, Presidents Obama and Putin have an historic opportunity to rise to the challenge. They should meet not later than this year to begin tackling the bilateral and multilateral arms control agenda separately from any other important issues dealt with the G-8 and G-20 groups that – no doubt – should be debated at other venues.Their goal should be to restore mutual trust and to revitalize the genuine arms control process between their countries and encourage other nations to follow suit.
Once upon a time President Ronald Reagan observed: “People mistrust each other because they arm, and people arm because they mistrust each other”. We should break up this vicious circle. And we can disrupt this notion which seemingly has no end in sight.
By our joint dedication, by our joint commitments, by our joint efforts.